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Abstract
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are emerging as a solution for large scale high
speed internet access through their scalability, self conguring and low cost. But as
compared to wired networks, WMNs are largely prone to dierent security attacks
due to its open medium nature, distributed architecture and dynamic topology.
Denial of service (DoS) attacks is one of the most common types of attack which
is possible in WMNs. DoS attacks are most common in networks which connect to
internet and since WMNs are mainly designed for fast and long distance internet
access this type of attacks are common in the network. In our work we mainly
concentrate our study on two denial of service attacks namely gray hole attacks
(a.k.a selective forwarding attacks) and black hole attacks. Wireless mesh networks
consist of both mesh routers and mesh clients. We conne our studies to mesh
routers which are stationary. We implement both gray hole attack and black
hole attack in mesh routers and study the delivery ratio of the network with and
without the presence of attack routers. By simulating the scenario with AODV
protocol we studied the delivery ratio of packets and nd out how it is aecting the
network in the presence of an attack router. After studying the results we propose
a new detection algorithm based on overhearing the neighboring node to which
the packet is forwarded. By keeping the history of number packets forwarded and
the number of packets overheard the algorithm determines the number of packets
dropped and determines the probability of attack. This probability is checked with
the threshold value of probability and determines whether a router is misbehaving
or not. We also considered the possibility of false positives and took necessary
measures in the algorithm to reduce it. If a router is found misbehaving it is
removed from the network and excluded from further forwarding of packets. We
analyze our algorithm in the presence of an attack router and detect the attack
router and study the improvement in the delivery ratio. Through simulation we
evaluate the performance of our algorithm depending on the packet delivery ratio
achieved and time.
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Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are a multi-hop wireless communication among
dierent nodes are dynamically self-organized and self-congured, with the nodes
in the network automatically establishing an ad-hoc network and maintaining
the mesh connectivity. WMNS are emerged as a promising concept to meet the
challenges in wireless networks such as exibility, adaptability, recongurable ar-
chitecture etc [1]. WMNs consist of two kinds of nodes: mesh routers and mesh
clients. Mesh routers are routers which forms the stationary or least mobile part
of the mesh network with less power constraint and forms the backbone of the
mesh network. Mesh clients are nodes which are mobile in the network with
power constraints. Though mesh clients can also do routing by forwarding pack-
ets to the next node in mesh networking the hardware and software platform for
them are much simpler compared to mesh routers. Mesh routers can do all the
gateway/bridge functions as in conventional wireless router, in addition to that it
contains additional functions to support mesh routing. They can support multiple
wireless interfaces built on either the same or dierent wireless access technologies.
Thus mesh routers are dedicated and stationary nodes for routing functions with
less power constraint. Mesh clients are nodes with no gateway/bridge functions
and only one wireless interface is needed in mesh clients. Wireless mesh networks
can be integrated with other networks because of the bridge/gateway functions
provided by the mesh router. The presence of mesh routers and hop by hop
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forwarding in WMNs bring many advantages compared to conventional ad-hoc
network such as low up-front cost, higher scalability, easy network maintenance,
robustness, reliable and need less transmission power.
A wireless mesh network enables ad-hoc mode peer to peer interconnection
among mesh clients are is called client meshing [1]. With client meshing, mesh
routers that stay outside the radio coverage of a mesh router can rely on other
intermediate clients to relay packets to them to get WMN access network connec-
tions. Thus packets from a mesh client which lies far away from the mesh router
has to travel multi hop client-to-client and client-to-router wireless link before
reaching its destination. The number of hops is determined by the geographical
location of the client and also the organization structure of the access network.
The architecture of wireless mesh networks can be classied in to three main
groups based on the functionalities of the nodes namely infrastructure/backbone
WMNs, client WMNs and Hybrid WMNs. In infrastructure WMNs wireless mesh
routers will form a mesh of self-conguring, self healing links among themselves.
With gateway functionality these routers can be connected to the internet. This
approach provides backbone for conventional clients and enables integration of
WMNs with existing wireless networks, through gateway/bridge functionalities in
mesh routers. In client meshing the client devices will form a mesh to perform
routing and conguration functionalities as well as providing end-user applications
to users. In this architecture no mesh routers are present and thus are same as the
conventional ad-hoc network. Hybrid WMNs is the combination of infrastructure
and client meshing and a mesh network is formed between the clients and as well
as the routers. Mesh clients can access the network through mesh routers as well
as directly meshing with each other.
Because of the self congurable architecture of wireless mesh networks and the
wide usage of WMNs for accessing internet, mesh routers and clients are prone to
dierent type of security issues. So providing solution to the security challenges is
a major research area in recent years in the elds of WMNs. WMNs are facing two
broad categories of attacks such as passive attacks and active attacks. In the case
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of passive attack, the attackers simply analyze and listen to the network trac with
the objective of capturing sensitive information which can be used later to launch
an active attack on the network [2]. Active attacks are which will directly damage
the network bandwidth either by tampering, modication or just by dropping of
packets. Because of the multi hop nature and ad-hoc connectivity, WMNs are
prone to both kinds of these attacks. The three important features of a secure
network are condentiality, integrity and service availability. Condentiality is
compromised by passive attacks, integrity by active attacks and availability by
the most severe form of active attack on internet namely Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks. Since WMNs is mainly used in long distance internet access and other
applications which uses internet, DoS attack is treated as the highest security risk
for this network, as DoS uses internet as a platform to be launched.
Denial of Service is one of the major issues of all types of wireless mesh net-
works as it is mainly designed for internet access . When authorized users are not
provided a request service within a dened maximum interval of time, it means
that a DoS violation has occurred. It is the most harmful and dangerous attack
which can be launched any layer of wireless mesh networks. DoS attack can be
launched in physical layer by radio jamming a device, in MAC layer by sending
bulk MAC control messages to an innocent neighbor or by holding the MAC chan-
nel for unnecessary continuous transmission. Network layer is highly vulnerable
to dierent DoS attacks due to multi-hop routing, as the number of hop increases
the routing overheads increase. DoS attack in network layer can aect the routing
mechanism or can degrade the network performance by exhausting the network
resources. A DoS attack in network layer can be black hole attack in which a
malicious node absorbs all the packets forwarded towards the target node and
dropping those packets or dropping all the packets go through the malicious node.
Another form of attack is the selective dropping attack or gray hole attack in which
the malicious node selectively dropping some packets or randomly dropping some
packets. Worm hole attack is another form of attack which will create networking
disruptions. Another for DoS attack in network layer called the ooding attack in
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which the attacker transmits a ood of packets to the target node or to congest
the network and degrade its performance [2].
In our study we deal with two types of denial of service attacks in network layer
namely black hole attacks and gray hole attacks and propose a defense mechanism
for detecting and eliminating the attacks. In our work we concentrate our study on
the mesh routers alone which are the stationary part of WMNs. We implemented
the two attacks in Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol and
studied the impact of these attacks in the network. The protocols implemented
are considering attacks on the data packets passed and forward the control packets
without dropping. Simulation of the attack is done in ns-2.34 (network simulator
2). Although ns-2.34 contains the AODV protocol, there were no modules avail-
able to implement the malicious nodes. So we modied the AODV protocol to
implement gray hole and black hole attack and added as a new protocol to ns-2.34.
After implementing both black hole and gray hole attack as new two protocols we
studied the network performance with the presence of attack node and without
that. As expected the network performance of the network degrades in the pres-
ence of attack node. Afterwards we proposed a solution for eliminating the attack
nodes from the network based on a detection algorithm. The algorithm is based
on overhearing the neighboring nodes and observing the forwarding behavior of
the nodes. For overhearing the neighboring nodes the AODV protocol should be
in promiscuous mode in which the router can over hear the data forwarded by
the neighboring nodes. Since promiscuous mode is not implemented in ns-2.34 we
evaluated our algorithm by implementing in perl language and analyzing the trace
les obtained during the gray hole and black hole attack simulation. Simulation
result shows that our solution eliminates the attacker nodes from the network and
there by improving the delivery ratio of the network.
1.2 Thesis Organization
In chapter 2 we presented wireless mesh networks and also the three dierent
architectures and their vulnerabilities to denial of service attacks including black
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hole and gray hole attack. We also present the dierent routing metrics which
are used in WMNs. In chapter 3 we described AODV protocol in detail and how
gray hole attack and black hole attack makes the protocol to misbehave and also
described how the new protocols supporting attacks are implemented in ns-2.34. In
chapter 4 we explains our proposed algorithm to detect and eliminate the attacks
and also the simulation and evaluation of the algorithm and the results obtained.
Finally Chapter 5 discusses the concluding remarks and future research work.
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Back ground
2.1 Wireless Mesh Networks
Wireless Mesh Network is a promising wireless technology for several emerging
and commercially interesting applications, e.g., broadband home networking, com-
munity and neighborhood networks, coordinated network management, intelligent
transportation systems. It is gaining possible attention as a possible way for Inter-
net service providers and other end-users to establish robust and reliable wireless
broadband service access at a reasonable cost. Dierent from traditional wireless
networks, nodes in WMN automatically establish and maintain network connec-
tivity. This feature brings many advantages for the end-users, such as low up-front
cost, easy network maintenance, robustness, and reliable service coverage [3]. The
gateway and bridge functionalities in mesh routers enable the integration of wire-
less mesh networks with various existing wireless networks, such as wireless sensor
networks, wireless-Fidelity (Wi-Fi), and WiMAX [1]. Some of the characteristics
of wireless mesh networks are as follows:
• Increased Reliability
In WMNs the wireless mesh routers provide multiple paths between the
sender and receiver of the wireless connection. This eliminates single point
failures and potential bottleneck links, which increases the communication
reliability. Some of the common problems in wireless networks such as node
failures, path failures etc can be over come by the presence of multiple paths.
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Thus WMN operates reliably over an extended period of time even in the
presence of these failures.
• Low Installation Costs
In a wireless network, if we want to provide full coverage in a metro scale
area to provide internet connection a large number of access points (APs) are
required and each of these APs should be connected to internet through a
wired connection. The main draw back of this solution is of high infrastruc-
ture costs, because an expensive cable connection is required to the wired
internet backbone. WMN reduces this infrastructure costs in which only a
few points is required to connect to the wired network and the other routers
will access the network through those which are connected. So implementa-
tion of WMN can be made fast in the presence of less wired points and also
the network can be modied at a reasonable cost.
• Large Coverage Area
One of the disadvantages of wireless LANs is that for a specic transmission
power, the coverage and connectivity of WLANs decreases as the distance
of the end user from the access point increases. On the other hand, the
multi hop and multi channel communication provided by WMNs increases
the coverage and connectivity of wireless mesh networks without much per-
formance degradation [1].
• Automatic Network Connectivity
Wireless mesh networks are dynamically self-organized and self-congured,
in other words mesh clients and mesh routers automatically establish net-
work connectivity. For example when new nodes are added into the network,
those nodes utilize their meshing functionalities to automatically discover
all possible mesh networks and determine the optimal paths to the wired
9
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internet [1]. Moreover the existing mesh routers reorganize the network
considering the newly available routes and hence the network can be easily
expanded.
In this chapter we present survery about the dierent architectures of WMNs,
routing metrics which are used in dierent routing protocols in WMNs followed
by routing protocols, and nally the security vulnerabilities in dierent layers in
the WMNs due to Denial of Service attacks with concentrating our study mostly
on DoS attacks in the network layer of wireless mesh networks.
2.2 Network Architecture
As mentioned in chapter 1, the architectures in wireless mesh network can be
classied in to three dierent types.
2.2.1 Infrastructure/Backbone WMNS
Internet 
Mesh Router
with gateway
Mesh Router Mesh Router
with gateway
Mesh Router
Mesh Router with 
gateway/bridge
Mesh Router with 
gateway/bridge
Mesh Router with 
gateway/bridgeMesh Router with 
gateway/bridge
Access point
Wi-Fi Networks
Base 
Station
Cellular Networks
Base 
station
WiMaX Networks
Wired Clients
Wireless clients
Wireless Mesh 
Backbone 
Figure 2.1: Infrastructure/backbone WMNS
In this architecture the mesh routers in WMNs are connected and form a
mesh and will provide an infrastructure for clients, as shown in Fig. 2.1 , where
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solid lines indicates wired link where as dashed lines indicate wireless links. The
backbone routers can be built using dierent radio technologies in addition to
the mostly used IEEE 802.11 technologies [1]. The mesh routers form a self-
conguring and self-healing mesh among themselves. With gateway function few
of the mesh routers will be connected to the internet. The conventional clients with
an Ethernet interface can connect to any of the mesh routers through the Ethernet
interface to communicate with others or to access the internet. These routers form
a meshing known as infrastructure meshing which acts as an infrastructure to the
client nodes. Clients having the same radio technology as the routers can connect
directly to them others have to send packets to their access points or base stations
which will be connected to the routers through the gateway for internet access.
This approach enables integration of WMNs with existing wireless networks and
also provides a backbone for conventional clients.
2.2.2 Client WMNS
In this architecture clients form a mesh network among themselves and no routers
exist. The clients will establish peer-to-peer networks among them and consti-
tute the actual network performing routing and conguration functions as well
as providing end-user applications to costumers. The clients will communicate
using a single radio interface among the devices and a packet is forwarded to des-
tination by hopping through the device. Thus, a Client WMNs is same as the
conventional ad-hoc network. By comparing with the Infrastructure WMNs the
requirements on the clients increased in Client WMNs because the end-users must
perform additional functions such as routing and self-conguration.
2.2.3 Hybrid WMNS
Hybrid WMN is a combination of both Infrastructure and Client WMN in the
sense that both the routers and clients will form mesh networking [1]. Routers will
form the backbone by meshing each other and the clients can form mesh network
among themselves for communicating hop-by-hop each other and to connect to
the backbone router. Thus mesh clients can access the network through mesh
11
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Wireless mesh clients
Figure 2.2: Client WMNS
routers as well as meshing with other mesh clients. While the meshing of routers
to form backbone network will provide connectivity to other networks such as
internet, Wi-Fi, WiMaX, cellular and sensor networks, the routing capability of
mesh clients will provide improved connectivity and coverage inside the WMNs.
Since from our study of dierent architectures we can see that hybrid WMNs
has all the advantages of a wireless mesh network, the characteristics of WMNs
are outlined according to this architecture as stated in [1]are:
• WMNs support ad hoc networking and have the capability of self-forming,
self-healing and self-organization.
• WMNs are a multi-hop wireless networks like ad-hoc networks, but with a
wireless backbone network provided by mesh routers.
• Mesh routers have minimum mobility or stationary and are dedicated to
routing and conguration, which reduces the load of mesh clients and other
12
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Conventional 
Clients
Wireless mesh clients
Figure 2.3: Hybrid WMNS
nodes.
• Mobility of end nodes is supported through the wireless infrastructure.
• Mesh routers integrate heterogeneous networks including both wired and
wireless networks and thus multiple type of network access exist in WMNs.
• Power consumption constraints are dierent for mesh routers and mesh
clients.
• WMNs are not stand-alone and need to be compatible and interoperable
with other networks.
2.3 Routing Metrics for WMNs
Most of the ad hoc routing protocols use hope count as a routing metric. In the
early stages these routing metrics are also used in WMNs. These assume that
the link in the path work properly or not work at all and consider all links of
equal bandwidth. So in this case minimizing the hop count will reduce the packet
delay and also increases the throughput. But in wireless mesh networks links are
13
2.3 Routing Metrics for WMNs
not of equal bandwidth. A minimum hop count path has higher average distance
between nodes present in that path compared to a higher hop count path. This
reduces the strength of the signal received by the nodes in that path and thereby
increases the loss ratio at each link. Hence, it is always possible that a two-hop
path with good link quality provides higher throughput than a one-hop path with
a poor/lossy link. The wireless links usually have asymmetric loss rate. Hence,
new routing metrics based on the link quality like ETX (Expected Transmission
Count), per-hop RTT (Round-Trip Time), and per-hop packet pair is proposed [4].
• Expected Transmission Count (ETX)
The metric ETX is dened as the expected number of transmissions (includ-
ing retransmissions) needed to successfully deliver a packet over a link. A
successful transmission requires acknowledgment back to the sender. ETX
considers transmission loss probability in both directions, which may not be
equal. The multi-radio multi-channel architecture is used in WMNs to im-
prove the throughput. In this case the routing metric based on link quality
alone is not sucient. It should also consider the channel diversity on the
path. To achieve this new routing metric WCETT (Weighted Cumulative
Expected Transmission Time) is proposed.
• Weighted Cumulative Expected Transmission Time (WCETT)
WCETT takes both link quality and channel diversity into account. The
link quality is measured by a per-link metric called Expected Transmission
Time (ETT). ETT is the expected time to transmit a packet over a link.
The WCETT metric takes into consideration the quality of links and the
intra ow interference along the path. But it fails to take into account inter
ow interference on the path. Thus, another routing metric MIC (Metric
of Interference and Channel switching) is proposed for multi-channel multi-
radio WMNs to overcome this drawback.
14
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• Metric of Interference and Channel Switching (MIC)
MIC considers the quality of links; inter ow interference, and intra ow
interference. This metric is based on Interference-Aware Resource Usage
(IRU) and Channel Switching Cost (CSC) metrics. IRU captures the dier-
ences in the transmission rate and the loss ratios of the wireless link and the
inter ow interference.
2.4 Routing Protocols in WMNs
All the routing protocols available for the prior works in wireless networks espe-
cially multi-hop ad hoc networks work well for wireless mesh networks. Thus the
protocols designed for ad-hoc networks such as Ad-hoc On-demand Distant Vec-
tor Protocol (AODV), Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), and Destination Sequence
Distant Vector routing (DSDV) works well with wireless mesh networks too. Since
we are using AODV protocol for implementing gray hole attack in WMNs we will
discuss about this protocol in detail in Chapter 3. Here we will discuss some of
the protocols which are exclusively designed for wireless mesh networks by tak-
ing into consideration of the routing metrics we discussed. Since wireless mesh
networks use two antennas for transmitting and receiving packets as compared to
one antenna in ad hoc networks and also the link quality between dierent nodes
in the network are not the same and to make advantage of meshing, new routing
protocols are designed to improve the routing quality of WMNs. Also the routers
in wireless mesh network have minimal mobility and there is no power constraint
and the clients are mobile with limited power. Hence the links in wireless mesh
networks are long lived compared to the links in ad-hoc networks. Since two
types of nodes present in WMNs, that is the mesh routers and mesh clients some
protocols even follow dierent routing techniques for routers and clients.
2.4.1 Link Quality Source Routing (LQSR)
LQSR is based on DSR and uses ETX as the routing metric. The main dierence
between LQSR and DSR is getting the ETX metric of each link to nd the path.
15
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DSR is modied in several ways to support routing according to link-quality met-
rics. This includes modications to Route Discovery and Route Maintenance and
new mechanisms for Metric Maintenance. During the route discovery phase, the
source node sends a Route Request (RREQ) packet to neighboring nodes. When
a node receives the RREQ packet, it appends its address to the source route and
the ETX value of the link in which the packet was received. The destination sends
the Route Reply (RREP) packet with a complete list of links along with the ETX
value of those links [4]. LQSR also propagates the ETX value of the links during
the data transmission phase as the link quality varies with time.
LQSR uses a reactive mechanism to maintain the metrics for the active links.
When a source-routed packet is sent, each intermediate node updates the source
route with the current metric for the next link. This carries up-to-date link metrics
forward along with the data. To get the link metrics back to the source of the
packet ow (where they are needed for routing computation), the recipient of the
packet sends a Route Reply back, conveying the up-to-date link metrics from the
arriving Source Route. This Route Reply is delayed up to one second because of
waiting for a piggy-backing opportunity.
LQSR uses a proactive background mechanism to maintain the metrics for all
links. Occasionally each LQSR node sends a Link Info message. The Link Info
contains current metrics for each link from the originating node. The Link Info is
piggy-backed on a Route Request. Hence it oods throughout the neighborhood
of the node. LQSR piggy-backs Link Info messages on all Route Requests if
possible. The link metric support also aects Route Maintenance. When Route
Maintenance notices that a link is not functional (because a requested Ack has
not been received), it penalizes the link's metric and sends a Route Error. The
Route Error carries the links updated metric back to the source of the packet.
2.4.2 Multi-Radio Link Quality Source Routing (MR-LQSR)
MR-LQSR is a new routing protocol for multi-radio multi-channel WMNs. It uses
WCETT as the routing metric. MR-LQSR is a combination of the LQSR protocol
and the WCETT metric. The neighbor node discovery and propagating the link
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metric to other nodes in the network in MR-LQSR is like in the DSR protocol.
But assigning the link weight and nding the path weight using the link weight are
dierent from DSR [4]. The main dierence is that DSR uses equal weight to all
links in the network and implements the shortest path routing whereas MR-LQSR
uses a WCETT path metric to nd the best path to the destination.
2.4.3 Load and Interference Balanced Routing Algorithm
(LIBRA)
A WCETT routing metric is used in a link state routing protocol does not satisfy
the isotonicity property of the routing protocol and leads to formation of routing
loops. To avoid the formation of routing loops by the routing metrics, LIBRA is
proposed. LIBRA uses MIC as the routing metric [4]. In this, a virtual network is
formed from the real network and decomposes the MIC metric into isotonicity link
weight assignment on the virtual network. The objective of MIC decomposition
is to ensure that LIBRA can use ecient algorithms such as Bellman-Ford or
Dijkstra's algorithm to nd the minimum weight path on the real network without
any forwarding loops.
2.5 Security Challenges in wireless mesh net-
works
The main features of a secure wireless mesh network are [5]:
• Condentiality
• Integrity
• Availability
The concept of condentiality is the assurance that sensitive data is being accessed
and viewed only by only those who are authorized to view it. Condentiality im-
plies that data is protected form breaches from unauthorized persons and the
damage that would be done to the organization, person or government bodies due
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to such breaches. The concept of integrity ensures that the data is not altered dur-
ing the transfer from sender to receiver. Integrity guarantees that a message sent
is the message received and the message is not altered intentionally or uninten-
tionally. Availability ensures the survivability of network services despite attacks.
The assurance of availability is very much a security issue. Long term Denial of
Service attacks can seriously hinder the network performance.
Wireless mesh networks are facing two categories of threats [2]:
• Passive attacks and
• Active attacks
In passive attacks, objective of the attacker is to capture sensitive information
of the target. The attackers simply analyze and listen to the network trac
with the objective to capture sensitive information of the target. These kinds of
attacks compromise the condentiality of the end user trac. the unauthorized
user gain illegal access to the network trac without modifying the trac. Passive
attacks are very dicult to detect, as such attacks do not harm the user trac
or normal network operations. However, most of the passive attacks are later
used for launching active attacks, as successful passive attack gain information
related to the target users, network topology, trac pattern etc. Such information
can later be used for launching active or DoS attack. Passive attacks can be
eavesdropping or trac analysis. WMN is more vulnerable to passive attacks as
compared to other wireless networks because of its multi hop nature and client
nodes may have direct ad-hoc connectivity and relay trac for one another [2], [6].
Active attacks can harm the network trac either by tampering, modications or
dropping the packets, can reduce bandwidth or produce jitter in transmission
and reduce through put. In case of active attacks also WMN is more vulnerable
compared to other wireless networks because of multi hop architecture and ad-hoc
connectivity. Multi-hop nature not only reduces bandwidth but also increases the
routing overheads which can be exploited by the attackers to launch active attacks
on WMNs. DoS attack is the most severe kind of wireless mesh attack.
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Condentiality is mostly encountered by passive attacks; integrity is threat-
ened by active attacks, while availability of the broadband wireless networks are
compromised by the most severe form of active attack, i.e. Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks [6].
2.5.1 Denial of Service attacks in Wireless Mesh Networks
Denial of Service (DoS) is one of the major issues of wireless mesh networks as it
is mainly designed for broadband internet access. When authorized users are not
provided a requested service within a dened maximum waiting time, it means
that a DoS violation has occurred [2]. It is the most harmful and dangerous attack
which can be launched on any layer of broadband Wireless Network. DoS attacks
prevent communication between network devices or a single device from sending or
receiving trac targeting availability. Availability ensures that authorized users
can access the data, services and network resources from anywhere anytime.
• Physical layer vulnerabilities
WMN uses the unlicensed 2.4GHz frequency band at physical layers. Phys-
ical layer can be made unavailable by a radio jamming device or a source
noise to interfere these layers. This kind of attack can be detected using ra-
dio analyzers. However it is dicult to implement as it requires specialized
hardware. In WMN, jamming attack can be launched from anywhere in the
mesh network.
• Link layer vulnerabilities
The WMN MAC uses shared medium among the nodes and is highly vulner-
able to selsh attack and collisions. The selsh attack improves the band-
width, throughput and QoS of the selsh node at the cost of another node.
RTS/CTS can be compromised for MAC layer DoS attack either by sending
bulk of MAC control messages to an innocent neighbor or by holding the
MAC channel for unnecessary continuous transmission keeping an innocent
19
2.6 Denial of Service attacks in Network layer of WMNS
node back-o.
• Network layer vulnerabilities
Network layer is highly vulnerable to dierent DoS attacks due to multi-hop
environment. As the number of hops increase the routing overheads increase.
DoS attacks at this layer can seriously disrupt the routing mechanism or can
degrade the network performance by exhausting network resources. The net-
work layer DoS attacks in WMN can be black hole attack, gray hole attack,
worm hole attack and ooding attack [2], [7]. In Black hole attack, the ma-
licious node absorbs all the trac going towards the target node and drops
the packets. In Gray hole attack, the malicious node selectively forwards
the packets to the destination node while dropping the other packets. Worm
hole attack will create routing disruptions. In ooding attack, the attacker
transmits a ood of packets toward a target node and congests the net-
work and degrades its performance. Flooding DoS attacks are dicult to
handle. All these attacks are there in WMNs because of its multi hop nature.
2.6 Denial of Service attacks in Network layer of
WMNS
• Rushing attacks
Rushing attacks targeting the on-demand routing protocols were amongst
the rst exposed attacks on the network layer of multi-hop wireless networks.
These attacks exploit the route discovery mechanism of on-demand routing
protocols. In these protocols, the node requiring the route to the destination
oods the Route Request message, which is identied by a sequence num-
ber [7]. To limit the ooding, each node only forwards the rst message that
it receives and drops remaining messages with the same sequence number.
To avoid collusion of these messages, the protocols specify a specic amount
of delay between receiving the Route Request message by a particular node
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and forwarding it. The malicious node launching the rushing attack forwards
the Route Request message to the target node before any other intermediate
node from source to destination. This can be easily achieved by ignoring the
specied delay .
• Worm hole attacks
A wormhole attack's objective is similar to rushing attack but the technique
used is dierent. During a wormhole attack, two or more malicious nodes
collude together by establishing a tunnel using an ecient communication
medium (wired connection or high-speed wireless connection, etc.). Dur-
ing the route discovery phase of on-demand routing protocols, the Route
Request messages are forwarded between the malicious nodes using the tun-
nel [8]. Therefore, the rst Route Request message that reaches the des-
tination node is the one forwarded by the malicious node. Consequently,
the malicious nodes are added in the path from source to destination. Once
the malicious nodes are included in the routing path, the malicious nodes
either drop all the packets, resulting in complete denial of service, or drop
the packets selectively to avoid detection.
• Black hole attacks
A black hole attack (or sink hole attack) also leads to denial of service in
wireless mesh networks. It also exploits the route discovery mechanism of on-
demand routing protocols. In a black hole attack, the malicious node always
replies positively to a Route Request even if it may not have a valid route
to the destination. Because the malicious node does not check its routing
entries, it will always be the rst to reply to the Route Request message [9].
Hence almost all the trac within the neighborhood of the malicious node
will be directed towards the malicious node, which may drop all the packets,
resulting in denial of service [10].
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• Gray hole attacks
A gray hole attack is a variant of the black hole attack. In a black hole at-
tack, the malicious node drops all the trac that it is supposed to forward.
This may lead to possible detection of the malicious node [11], [12]. In a gray
hole attack, the packets are dropped selectively, thus avoiding the detection.
A gray hole attack does not lead to complete denial of service, but it may
go undetected for a longer duration of time. This is because the malicious
packet dropping may be considered as congestion in the network [13]. This
also leads to selective packet loss.
• Sybil attacks
In a Sybil attack, a malicious node creates multiple identities in the network,
each appearing as a legitimate node. WMNs are supposed to take advantage
of the path diversity in the network to increase the available bandwidth
and reliability. But if the malicious node creates multiple identities in the
network, the legitimate nodes will add these identities in the list of distinct
paths available to a particular destination, assuming these identities to be
distinct network nodes [2]. When the packets are forwarded to these fake
nodes, the malicious node that created the identities processes these packets.
Consequently, all the distinct routing paths will pass through the malicious
node. The malicious node may then launch any of the above-mentioned
attacks. Even if no other attack is launched, the advantage of path diversity
is diminished, resulting in performance degradation.
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Gray hole and Black hole attacks
In this work we focus our attention to two special type of Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks called gray hole attack or selective dropping attack and black hole at-
tack or sink hole attack. We consider these attacks on the less mobile or almost
stationary wireless mesh routers. Gray hole attack is a type of attack in which
the attack router accepts the packets and refuses to forward certain packets by
just dropping the packets. In black hole attack the attack router will advertise
in the network that it has a fresh route to the destination and after that may
drop all the packets that it receives. Cryptographic techniques are used to protect
the physically unprotected mesh routers from various DoS attacks including gray
hole and black hole attacks. But if the router is compromised the attacker will
gain access to the private/public key pair of the router and can break through the
cryptographic systems. Thus non-cryptographic methods will provide a second
line of defense [14], [15]. In this work we try to develop a non cryptographic type
of defense by checking the forwarding of the upstream routers by overhearing their
transmission. We consider AODV routing protocol to implement these attacks.
3.1 Ad-hoc On-Demand Distant Vector (AODV)
routing protocol
AODV protocol is one of the commonly used in wireless mesh networks and is
proposed as one of the protocol in the IEEE 802.11s standard [16]. AODV is a re-
active distance vector routing protocol which will establish the path only when the
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router has some data to send. AODV borrows the basic route establishment and
maintenance mechanisms from the Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) and
the hop-to-hop routing vectors from the Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector
protocol (DSDV). To avoid routing loops AODVmakes use of the sequence number
in the control packets.
When source node intends to communicate with a destination node whose
route is not known it broadcasts a Route Request packet (RREQ). Each RREQ
contains an ID which uniquely identies the RREQ packet, source and destination
IP addresses and sequence numbers together with the various control ags. The
sequence number maintains the freshness of the control messages and the hop
count maintains the number of nodes between the source and the destination.
On receiving a RREQ message by the intermediate or neighboring node that has
not seen a source IP and ID pair or which doesn't contain a fresher route (larger
sequence number) to destination will rebroadcast the packet after incrementing
the hop count. Such intermediate nodes will also create a reverse route to the
source node for a particular interval of time.
When the RREQ reaches the destination node or any intermediate node which
has a fresher route to the destination a Route Reply (RREP) packet is generated
and unicast backward to the source of the RREQ. Each RREP contains the desti-
nation sequence number, source and destination IP addresses route life time and
the hop count together with control ags. Each intermediate node receiving a
RREP packet will increment the hop count and establishes a forward route to the
source of the packet and send the RREP packet in the backward route. A Route
Error (RERR) packet is send by a node to its neighboring nodes if there is a link
break observed in the active route. Once the route is updated by all the nodes
the source will send packet to the destination in the route.
When using AODV in multiple radios in a node, the RREQ is broadcasted
on all the interfaces of the node. In order to avoid broadcast storms each RREQ
is send after a random time interval. Intermediate node with more than one
interfaces and working on a channel will receive the RREQ and create a reverse
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route to the source of the packet. If the RREQ is a duplicate it is simply discarded.
The rst RREQ received by the destination or an intermediate node having route
to the destination is selected and all the other RREQs are discarded. Then RREP
is generated for the selected RREQ and is send back to the source of the RREQ
in the reverse path.
3.2 Black hole attacks
In a black hole attack the malicious node will always advertise in the network that
it has a fresher route to the destination by setting the sequence number to a large
value and will reply to the RREQ before other routers send a reply. Thus the
attacker router will attract all the trac in its transmission range towards itself
and then may drop the packets [17].
3.3 Gray hole attacks
In a wireless mesh network that uses AODV protocol one attacker node can drop
some selected packets according to some criteria or randomly. This is called gray
hole attack or selective drop attack. This type of attack is very dicult to detect,
especially in the wireless scenario, because packets can be dropped because of line
congestion, channel capacity, etc. In the simulation we used random dropping of
packets using the random function. While the packets are sending to destination,
packets are dropped randomly by the malicious node. Simulation of gray hole
attack is done on ns-2.34 [18]. In order to simulate gray hole attack on ns2 we had
to modify and implement the existing AODV protocol.
3.4 Implementing the new Routing Protocol in
NS-2 which show Gray hole behavior
Implementation of the gray hole attack is done in AODV protocol and simulated in
NS-2.34. To show the gray hole behavior, one node is selected as attack node and
it will drop packets randomly. The attack node should be able to participate in
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Figure 3.1: ns  lib:tcl GAODV modiation
the AODV messaging. For this the new protocol which exhibits gray hole attack
should be able to participate in AODV messaging. Implementation of the new
routing protocol which perform gray hole attack is explained below.
All routing protocols in NS2 are installed in the ns-2.34 directory. We start
by duplicating the AODV protocol in this directory and named the directory as
"GAODV "(all the header les and classes of AODV directory are modied).
All the les in the AODV directory are modied with GAODV such as gaodv:cc,
gaodv:h, gaodv rqueue:cc,gaodv rqueue:h etc except for "aodv packet:h. The new
protocol will use the same aodv packets and thus its possible for the new GAODV
protocol to send the same AODV packets. So we have changed all the names
of classes, structures, functions in all the les except for the struct names that
belong to the AODV packet:h code. By creating all this we have designed aodv
and gaodv protocols to send packets with each other. To integrate the GAODV
protocol to the NS2, two common les has to be modied. Since we are using the
same packets used in AODV, we don't have to modify the common les related
to packet. Thus had to modify two les [18].
The rst modied le is the ns   lib:tcl. It's in this le the protocol agents
are coded in a procedure. So here we had to add the protocol agent for the newly
created GAODV protocol. When a node is using GAODV protocol this agent is
scheduled at the beginning of the simulation and is assigned to the nodes which
use the protocol.
The next le to be modied is the ns   agent:tcl. In this we have to set the
port numbers for the new routing protocol. sport is the source port and dport is
the destination port.
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Figure 3.2: ns  agent:tcl GAODV modication
Figure 3.3: makefile:in GAODV modication
The third le modied is the makefile:in in the root directory of ns-2.34. This
le is modied for creating the object les for the cpp coded les. After all the
implementations are ready, we have to recompile NS-2 again to create the object
les.
Till now we have implemented a new routing protocol in NS-2 which is labeled
as GAODV. But we still didn't implement the gray hole attack in this protocol.
As of now this protocol will act similar to the AODV protocol. To add gray hole
behavior in to the new protocol we made we had to make some changes in the
gaodv:cc C++ le. By explaining the working mechanism of AODV and GAODV
protocol we will describe the changes made to the gaodv:cc.
In aodv:cc code when a packet is received it is received by a function called
the recv and the received packets are processed based on the type of the packet.
In this code the dierent control packets in AODV like RREQ, RREP and RERR
packets are processed by dierent functions. The recv function checks whether
the received packet belongs to any of these control packets. If it so then it will
call the recvAODV function. If the received packet is a data packet, usually
Figure 3.4: gaodv:cc GAODV modication
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the AODV protocol will forward the packet to the destination address. But in
GAODV protocol the code is modied such that it will drop random packets
without forwarding it. This attack is implemented in the recv function of GAODV.
First the conditions checks whether the packet is destined to itself if it so it will
accept the packet, otherwise a condition is checked which is made of random
numbers and if the condition becomes true the packet is dropped otherwise it will
forward the packet.
3.5 Implementing Black hole behavior
Implementation of the black hole attack as a protocol is similar to that of gray
hole attack implementation and the library changes are similar and we used the
name BAODV instead of GAODV. The gaodv:cc le is modied such that instead
of dropping packets randomly it will drop all the packets using if else condition
and saved the le as baodv:cc.
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Proposed Algorithm
When a node wants to send a packet it will send the RREQ packet and if it
receives a route reply rst from a normal behaving node, then everything will
work ne. But if it gets reply from an attacker node in which implements selective
dropping all the packets will not reach the destination. Some packets will be
dropped by attacker node. If the selective dropping attack reduces the delivery
ratio drastically an algorithm should be implemented to identify such nodes and
prevent them from participating in the data transfer. A RREP from an attacker
node can reach the source node earlier than a normal node if it is near to the source
node or in other words the shortest path from the source to the destination. In
this work we focus on developing an algorithm which focus on single dropping
attackers in wireless mesh network and concentrate our study on the stationary
routers which are present in hybrid wireless mesh networks.
4.1 Related Work
Most of the prior works related to gray hole attacks were studied in the area of
ad hoc and sensor networks. These works can be used in the area of wireless
mesh networks too. But since wireless mesh networks are mainly targeting the
broadband usage these type of attacks will be more common in wireless mesh
networks compared to other two networks. So more research work is needed in
the eld of security in WMNs. Karlof.et.al [19] proposed selective forwarding
attack for the rst time in wireless sensor networks and suggested that multi path
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forwarding can used to counter the attack. But the algorithm fails to suggest a
method to isolate the attacking node and remove from the network. Marti.et.al [20]
proposed a technique called Watchdog, in which a node continously monitors the
neighbouring nodes to which the packet is sent and to check whether the packet is
forwarded or not. But the algorithm fails to detect the attacker in the presence of
selective forwarding attack and to completely remove the node from the network.
Devu Manikantan Shila.et.al [14], [15] proposed a channel aware detection of gray
hole attack based on CAD algorithm in which they observe the forwarding nature
of the downstream node as well as the upstream node and detects the attack
node. The algorithm works well in the presence of normal channel losses such as
wireless medium losses and MAC layer collisions but for identifying the attack,
extra packets has to be send by the source node.
4.2 Assumptions
We assume that all the routers that are in the network are stationary and have no
energy constraints. We also assume that the wireless interfaces support promis-
cuous mode operation. Promiscuous mode means that if a node A is within range
of a node B, it can overhear communications to and from B even if those commu-
nications do not directly involve A. While promiscuous mode is not appropriate
for all wireless mesh network scenarios (particularly some military scenarios) it
is useful in other scenarios for improving routing protocol performance. We also
assume that the each router is provided with an innite buer size so that no
packets are dropped because of buer overow. In the case of black hole attack
we assume that the attack node will drop all the packets that it recieves. Finally
we also assume that each mesh router is provided with a private/public key pair
and also all the public keys of other routers in the network. These keys are used to
protect the packets generated while broadcasting the packet reporting the attack
generated by the algorithm.
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4.3 Parameters and Thresholds
Before going in to details about the algorithm, we introduce the parameters and
threshold values used in the algorithm. At each router nt denotes the number of
packets transmitted under a particular threshold to the downstream node. This
threshold is denoted as nthreshold. At the same router no denotes the number of
packets overheard by the router. no can be calculated by overhearing the down-
stream node to which the data is sent. nd is used to denote the number of packets
dropped by the downstream node. Pa is used to denote the probability of attack by
the downstream router and also Pg and Pb are the threshold values called the prob-
ability of gray hole attack and probability of black hole attack respectively.interval
is the number of times the probability of attack is checked with the threshold val-
ues in a given interval.
4.4 Attack Detection Algorithm
We present an algorithm for nding the intentional selective dropping attack by
a node and if all the packets are dropped will identify the attack as a black
hole attack by checking the forwarding of packets by the immediate neighbor
downstream node to which the data is sent. For this we have to overhear the
trac by the neighboring nodes.
In our algorithm at each mesh router, the router will maintain a packet count
history of the number of packets it has forwarded to the downstream node and
also the number of packets it has overheard for the forwarded packets. When
a router forwards a packet to the downstream node, the number of packet sent
(nt) is incremented and also buers the packet for a certain time period. Then it
overhears the packet which is forwarded by the downstream node and compares
with the packet in the buer. When a match is found the number of packets
forwarded by downstream node (no) is increased. Once the match is found or
if the time period is over the packet is deleted from the buer. If the packet
forwarding is not heard with in the time period the algorithm assumes that the
packet is dropped by the downstream node. After sending out a threshold number
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of packets (nthreshold), the number of packets dropped (nd) is calculated and is
the dierence of the number of packets transmitted to the number of packets
overheard.
nd = nt - no
According to these observations each router will maintain a probability value called
the Probability of attack (Pa), which is obtained by the number of packets dropped
by the downstream node(nd) to the number of packets forwarded by the router to
the downstream (nt).
Pa =
nd
nt
The obtained probability of attack (Pa) is compared with a threshold value of
probability called probability of black hole attack (Pb) and if Pa is greater Pb then
a possibility of black hole attack is identied.
if Pa > Pb , possibility of a black hole attack.
When this condition fails Pa is compared with probability of gray hole attack
(Pg), and if Pa is found greater than Pg then a possibility of gray hole attack is
identied.
if Pa > Pg , possibility of a gray hole attack.
If these conditions becomes true twice with in the interval an attack is identied.
If Pa becomes greater than Pb twice in the interval then a packet is broadcasted
to all the routers in the mesh network by the identifying router with the reporter
node id, attacker node id and also the type of attack denoted by 'B'. If Pa becomes
greater than Pg twice in the interval then a packet is forwarded as before with
the type of attack as 'G'. If Pa is greater than Pb and Pg once in the interval then
the type of attack is 'G'.
At each router they maintain a table called the Attack table. When an attack is
reported each router will update its attack table with the reporter node id, attacker
node id and also the type of attack. If a router is reporter by two dierent routers
then that is identied as an attack node. In AODV protocol if a node recieves a
RREQ it will check in the attack table and will not forward the RREQ to a attack
router there by isolating them from the network.
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Reporter Node id Attacker Node id Type of Attack
Router 5 Router 6 G
Router 2 Router 6 G
Table 4.1: Attack Table
4.5 Factors inuencing the threshold values
There are some factors which will inuence the threshold values used in the pro-
posed algorithm. They are
• False positives
False positives will occur when router gives a false alarm when no threat
or attack exists.The threshold values should be determined such that the
chance of false positives are less and at the same time should detect the
attack. The probability of false positives will increase with increase in the
interval and also when nthreshold decreases. A decrease in the threshold
probability Pg also increases the probability of false positives.
• Loss Due to wireless channel
Since mesh routers work in a wireless environment packets can be lost due
to the wireless channel. Mesh routers are deployed statically over a long
period of time and the loss due to the wireless channel can be computed
by observing the historical data. Thus the packet loss probability due to
wireless channel can be calculated from the channel parameters [14], [15].
So while determining the value of Pg the packet loss probability should be
considered over the interval and Pg should be above this probability.
• MAC layer collisions
Another form of packet loss in wireless networks is due to MAC layer colli-
sions. The probability of collision should be taken in to account in deciding
the value of Pg.
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• Failure to overhear transmission
If an ambigous collision occurs at the listening node while the packet is for-
warded the listening node will fail to overhear the transmission and assumes
that the packet is dropped. So the probability of failure to overhear trans-
mission should be considered before determining the threshold values.
• Quality of Service (QoS)
Each network will provide some minimum QoS and this will also aect deter-
mining the threshold values. The threshold values should be such that the
network should be functioning in the QoS requirements even in the presence
of attack routers.
4.6 Simulation of gray hole and black hole attack
in ns2
We have implemented the protocol which will implement gray hole attack in ns2.
Now we have to do simulate the scenario to check whether the protocol is working
properly or not. To test whether the implementation of GAODV is working cor-
rectly or not we have created a scenario in which 8 routers are connected initially
and checked the data trac when all routers are using the original AODV proto-
col. After that one of the routers is set to use GAODV protocol and compared the
data trac in both occasions. As expected the delivery ratio of data is decreased
when we use GAODV protocol.
4.6.1 Simulation parameters and Metrics
In our simulation we used the UDP connection instead of using a TCP connection.
The motivation behind using UDP ahead of TCP is that, in TCP the protocol
will close the connection if it won't get a reply ACK from the destination for the
packets send. So if the GAODV protocol is implemented then the TCP will close
the connection when the router drops the packet. Thus UDP protocol is used in
the simulation in which no acknowledgement is received by the source node for
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the packets send. Moreover we were able to count the number of packets sent
and received in the simulation because of using the UDP protocol. If the TCP
protocol is used the source node will stop the connection if the TCP ACK packets
are not received.
We choose a scenario in which 8 routers are connected numbered from node 0
-node 7. A UDP connection is created between the node 2 and node 7 and also
between node 5 and node 7 with packets are sent from node 2 and node 5 towards
node 7. UDP connection is attached with a Constant Bit Rate (CBR), which
created constants packets on the UDP connections. CBR packet size is 1024 bytes
long and the packets are generated at an interval of .05s. Node 2 will start sending
packets from 0.1s and node 5 will start at 0.2s and continue trac till 4s. The
MAC layer used is MAC 802:11 with a data rate of 1Mbyte. We manually dene
the position of the routers and no movement is added to the routers, since most
of the routers in the hybrid wireless mesh networks are stationary.
4.6.2 Result of Simulation
First we simulated the network with no attack node and checked the delivery ratio
of the data sent.Delivery ratio is the performance metric used and is the ratio of
the data received by destination to the data sent which is expressed in percentage.
In the absence of attack the delivery ratio obtained is 100.Then we introduced a
malicious node in the network which will implement gray hole attack and drop
packets in a random fashion as explained earlier. Router 6 is selected as the attack
router which is in the path of the transmission. Since the node 2 and node 5 is
sending UDP packets no acknowledgement is sent back by the destination node 7.
The delivery ratio is calculated using the data received by node 7 to the data sent
by node 2 and node 5. As expected node 6 drops some packets randomly and the
delivery is decreased from 100 to a range of 45-60 as shown in Figure 4.1.
Similarly we implemented the black hole attack to router 6 and checked the
delivery ratio and the ratio was coming down from 100 percentage to zero.
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Figure 4.1: Comparison between delivery ratio of network with and without gray
hole attack
4.7 Simulation of the Proposed Algorithm
Previously we implemented both gray hole and black hole attack in ns-2.34 and
obtained the results. Since we were not able to implement the promiscous mode
of operation in ns-2.34 it become impossible to overhear the transmission of the
neighbouring router. So we have written our algorithm in Perl language [21] and
using the trace les obtained during the previous simulation. Our algorithm will
take the trace le as input. Since we are not using simulator for the evaluation
of the algorithm, some assumptions are taken while evaluating the algorithm. We
assume that once the attack is detected by the neighbouring routers, no time is
required for the packet reporting the attack to reach the source and to establish a
new path to the destination. This assumption is taken because once we detect the
attack in the router we assume that all the remaining packets are routed towards
the destination without any drop.
First to determine the value of Pg we started sending packets from router 0 to
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Figure 4.2: Packet sent
router 7 with router 6 as attack node and the delivery ratio drop was from 100 to
60-75. Thus we checked the algorithm with dierent values of Pg and Pg=.35 was
giving a good result when the value of nthreshold=10 and interval=5 and Pb=0.9.
These threshold values were used in each neighbouring router and evaluated the
performance of the algorithm in the presence of both gray hole attack and black
hole attack.
In the graph in Figure 4.4, the value of nthreshold is taken as 10. That means
the probability of attack is checked after sending out each 10 packets. Since the
interval is given as 5 if the probability of attack (Pa) goes above the threshold
Pg=.35 twice with in 5 checks, a gray hole attack is identied. We assume that
once the attack is detected the source router will send a new Route Request and
a new path will be established from source to destination.
Similarly the black hole attack router also is identied with the value of Pb
set to 0.9. By the proposed algorithm we can observe from Figure 4.5 that the
delivery ratio is considerably increased.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison between delivery ratio of network with and without black
hole attack
4.8 Comparison of Proposed Scheme with CAD
algorithm
CAD Algorithm Proposed Algorithm
Attack detection is done by the
source router
Detected by the neighboring routers
Needs to sent extra packet to initiate
the detection
No need of extra packets for initiat-
ing the detection algorithm
Attack node is identied only if the
source router demands
Attack will be reported if a neighbor-
ing node observes misbehavior
Threshold values are dynamic and
thus changes according to channel
behavior
Threshold values are static and per-
formance is less in sudden channel
behavior changes
Detection doesnt depend on the data
trac through a node
Higher the data trac over a network
higher the chance that algorithm can
detect the attacker
Works well under dynamic channel
behavior
Works well under static channel be-
havior
Table 4.2: Comparison of proposed algorithm with CAD
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Figure 4.4: Comparison between gray hole attack and proposed algorithm with
Pg=.35, nthreshold=10,interval=5
Figure 4.5: Comparison between black hole attack and proposed algorithm with
Pb=.35, nthreshold=10,interval=5
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion and Future Work
In future we plan to make the threshold values dynamic in the presence of normal
loses due to wireless channel and MAC layer collisions and to work on the attacks
when the attack routers collude together.
Since routers in WMNs work in a fully wireless environment the packet can be
lost due to dierent factors. So nding an appropriate threshold value for detecting
the gray hole attack in real environment is really dicult. Wireless mesh networks
is having an open architecture and more prone to Denial of Service attacks due to
its use in broadband internet access.Thus more research work has to be done to
reduce the Denial of Service attacks and improve the network.
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